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Abstract 
A basic tenet of research on wisdom of the crowds – and key assumption of Condorcet’s Jury 
Theorem – is the independence of voters’ opinions before votes are aggregated. However, we often 
look for others’ opinions before casting our vote. Such social influence can push groups towards 
herding, leading to “madness of the crowds”. To investigate the role of social influence in joint 
decision making, we had dyads of participants perform a visual odd-ball search task together. In the 
Independent (IND) condition participants initially made a private decision. If disagreeing, discussion 
and collective decision ensued. In the Influence (INF) condition no private decisions were made and 
collective decision was immediately negotiated. Dyads that did not accrue collective benefit under 
IND condition improved with added social influence under INF condition. In Experiment 2, covertly, 
we added noise to one of the dyad members’ visual search display. The resulting increased 
heterogeneity in dyad members’ performances impaired the dyadic performance under IND 
condition (Bahrami et al., 2010). Importantly, dyadic performance improved with social influence 
under INF, replicating Experiment 1. Further analyses revealed that under IND condition, dyads 
exercised equality bias (Mahmoodi et al., 2015) by granting undue credit to the less reliable partner. 
Under INF condition, however, the more reliable partner (correctly) dominated the joint decisions. 
While social influence may impede collective success under ideal conditions, our results 
demonstrate how it can help the group members overcome factors such as equality bias, which 
could potentially lead to catastrophic failure.  
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Introduction 
Independently generated opinions of many lay individuals, if put together properly, can outperform 
experts (Condorcet, 1785; Jolyon J. Faria, Codling, Dyer, Trillmich, & Krause, 2009; Galton, 1907; 
Surowiecki, 2005). Such “wisdom of the crowd” depends critically on independence of individual 
votes, the competence of voters, and an appropriate aggregation schemes (Bates & Granger, 1969; 
Galton, 1907; Kerr & Tindale, 2011; Koriat, 2012). For example, the mean of economic forecasts 
made by independent individuals is typically more accurate than the forecast of the crowd’s average 
member (Zarnowitz, 1984).  
However, in everyday life, we often prefer to hear others’ opinions before casting our vote. This may 
prove a beneficial strategy, for example when information is not equally available to all group 
members and discussion can promote fact finding and problem solving of groups (Abrahamson, 
1991; Blinder & Morgan, 2000; Ehrmann & Stinson, 1999; Karl, Susskind, & Wallace, 2007). 
Individuals can accrue benefits from the opinions of others through social and observational learning 
(Bandura, 1977) and increase their accuracy (Farrell, 2011; Soll & Larrick, 2009; Yaniv, 2004). In 
animal behaviour, groups of many inaccurate individuals (many-wrong) can produce accurate group 
decisions in a distributed and decentralized way through social influence, a phenomenon also known 
as swarm intelligence (Bazazi et al., 2010; Berdahl, Torney, Ioannou, Faria, & Couzin, 2013; 
Bonabeau, Dorigo, & Theraulaz, 1999; Clark & Mangel, 1984).   
But social influence can have catastrophic consequences for group decisions too. For example, 
observational learning can become pathological as individuals choose to follow and imitate others’ 
actions and choices instead of using their own information in a cascade  leading to herding effects 
(Hirshleifer, 1995; Raafat, Chater, & Frith, 2009; Smith & Sorensen, 2000; Torney, Lorenzi, Couzin, & 
Levin, 2015). These effects can decrease the diversity of behaviours, increase group bias and reduce 
the collective accuracy (Koriat, 2012; Lorenz, Rauhut, Schweitzer, & Helbing, 2011; Lux, 1995; 
Muchnik, Aral, & Taylor, 2013; Stasser & Titus, 1985) sometimes with deadly consequences (Esser & 
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Lindoerfer, 1989; J. J. Faria, Krause, & Krause, 2010). Indeed, it is very often the case that 
deliberating groups are inflicted with social influence factors such as such as peer pressure and 
obligation to reach consensus, leading to “Madness” of the crowds (Janis, 1972; Mackay, 1841; 
Sunstein, 2004). It is therefore crucial to understand under what circumstances social influence 
enhances the wisdom of crowds, and when it leads to madness of the crowds.  
A recent theoretical investigation of wisdom of the crowds (Mavrodiev, Tessone, & Schweitzer, 
2012) posited that the impact of social influence on aggregated decision may depend on (among 
other factors) the “state of collective error” under minimal social influence. The theory predicts that 
if the crowd is not particularly wise under minimal influence, social influence should help. Recently 
the psychological and biological determinants of the state of collective error have been extensively 
studied (Bahrami et al., 2010, 2012a; Bang et al., 2014; Koriat, 2012; Sorkin, Hays, & West, 2001; 
Woolley, Chabris, Pentland, Hashmi, & Malone, 2010; Wright et al., 2012). Many of these studies 
have been conducted under conditions of minimal social influence ideal for wisdom of the crowds to 
emerge. It has been demonstrated that even with minimal influence, the state of collective error is 
indeed a precarious one. Groups of independent voters can be driven to failure reliably under 
laboratory conditions. Mahmoodi and colleagues (2015) argued that one reason for this may be that 
weighting others’ opinions proportional to their competence or reliability is not an easy, nor socially 
rewarding, operation. Instead, cooperating individuals seem to follow a heuristic dubbed equality 
bias: members of a dyad contributing to a joint decision operate as if everyone is as competent or 
reliable as everyone else (Mahmoodi et al., 2015). This is a sound strategy as long as dyad members’ 
are actually similarly reliable. However, when a large competence gap separates the individuals’, 
then equality bias is, by definition, misguided and proves catastrophic for the dyad. A number of 
other studies shown that heterogeneity of competence among group members can substantially 
impair the state of collective error (Bahrami et al., 2010; Bang et al., 2014).     
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Mahmoodi and colleagues (2015) suggested that equality bias may be robust to feedback 
information because it helps the dyad members cope with a number of potential difficulties by 
avoiding social exclusion and sharing responsibility for joint failures. For example, when one dyad’s 
much less reliable than the other, collective success would require that the dyad ignore the opinion 
of the less competent member repeatedly leading to an uncomfortable social exclusion. Moreover, 
in such situation, occasional errors made by the dominant (albeit more reliable) dyad member are 
likely to cause greater regret and more severe sense of responsibility. We wondered whether these 
socially awkward situations could be avoided if the pre-condition of independence of voting was 
relaxed. Specifically, removing the independent voting stage and allowing for maximal social 
influence might, paradoxically one may argue, remove the explicit disagreements and allow the dyad 
to consistently choose the more reliable opinion without incurring the social costs such as exclusion 
and regret. That such positive impact of social influence on collective performance should only be 
observed when a wide competence gap separates the dyad members is also consistent with 
Mavrodiev et al (2012) who predicted that social influence should be beneficial when a substantial 
collective error is observed under minimal social influence. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we employed a recently developed paradigm for uncertainty-ridden 
collective decision making (Bahrami et al., 2010) which allows assaying of collective and individual 
decision making. In order to empirically examine when social influence is beneficial and when it is 
detrimental for collective benefit, we examined collective decisions made by pairs (dyads) of 
individuals with and without making private decisions before negotiation of collective decision.  
Methods 
Participants were healthy male adults with normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, and 
provided a written informed consent before starting the experiment. Forty two participants (age 
25.5 ±7.3;Mean ± STD) were recruited for Experiment 1, and thirty (age 26±7.9;Mean ± STD) for 
Experiment 2. Participants in both experiments were recruited using the UCL Division of Psychology 
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and Language Sciences' database of registered volunteers. In order to avoid a possibility of task-
irrelevant sex-stereotypical behaviour effecting our data (Buchan, Croson, & Solnick, 2008; 
McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001) we avoided mixed-sex dyads and chose to test male 
participants only. Participants received a fixed monetary compensation for their contribution. Both 
experiments were approved by the local ethics committee.  
Pairs of participants (dyads) made individual and collective decisions in a visual perceptual task 
(Bahrami et al., 2010). Both dyad members sat in the same room and performed a 2-interval forced 
choice (2-IFC) visual search for contrast oddball on stimuli presented on separate monitors (Figure 
1A, and supplementary materials). In each trial, two visual search arrays (set size = 6; duration: 
83ms) were presented in consecutive intervals separated by a 1000ms blank screen. One of the two 
search arrays contained a contrast oddball item, i.e. the target, whose contrast was higher than all 
other distractors. Distractor contrast was fixed at 0.10. Target contrast varied randomly between 
trials and was determined by addition of anyone of 0.01, 0.03, 0.07 or 015 to the distractor baseline.  
The task was to decide in which interval the target appeared. Target interval was randomised across 
trials.  
The experimental conditions determined how the participants announced their decisions. These 
consisted of independent (IND) and influence (INF) conditions, administered in 2 separate blocks, 
counterbalanced across dyads (half of the dyads started with INF condition and half started with IND 
condition), each containing 128 trials (Figure 1A). In the IND condition, each participant initially 
made an independent, private, decision by pressing one of two available buttons on the mouse or 
keyboard. These privately made responses were then shared. If they did not agree, the dyad 
members proceeded to discuss their decisions and made a joint decision. The joint decision was 
declared by one of the participants using the same two buttons that they had used for their private 
response. Announcing the joint decision was delegated to the participant using the keyboard on odd 
trials and to the participant using the mouse on even trials. Feedback (‘CORRECT’ or ‘WRONG’) was 
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given at the end of each trial for private and joint responses. In the INF condition, participants did 
not make any private decisions, but started the discussion immediately after stimulus offset and 
made a collective decision directly. Declaration of joint decisions alternated between dyad members 
on odd and even trials similarly to IND condition.  
In experiment two, prior to the main test, each participant completed an isolated version of the 
same visual search task (48 trials). In this measurement, target contrast was determined dynamically 
using a 2-up-1-down staircase procedure(Levitt, 1971) to determine the participant’s contrast 
sensitivity. This initial procedure allowed us to determine the more and less sensitive members of 
each dyad prior to starting the main experiment. In the experiment proper white noise was added to 
the display of this less sensitive participant, making it harder to detect the target. This procedure 
ensured that a substantial sensitivity gap was inserted between the two members of each dyad 
leading to failure of collective decision making (Bahrami et al., 2010, 2012b; Mahmoodi et al., 2015).  
Beside this manipulation, the IND and INF conditions followed similarly to experiment 1. The 
participants did not know about the selective addition of noise to one but not the other participant’s 
stimulus and were told that the initial isolated test served as practice.  
Psychometric functions were constructed for each observer (Green, Swets, & others, 1966), and for 
each dyad, by plotting the proportion of trials in which the oddball was reported in the second 
interval against the contrast difference at the oddball location (the contrast in the second interval 
minus the contrast in the first) (Figure 1B). The psychometric curves consisted of a cumulative 
Gaussian function whose parameters were bias, 𝑏, and variance, 𝜎2. To estimate these parameters, 
a probit regression model was employed using the ‘glmfit’ function in MATLAB (release 2013b , The 
MathWorks Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, United States). A participant with bias 𝑏 and variance 𝜎2 
would have a psychometric curve, denoted 𝑃(∆𝑐), where ∆𝑐 is the contrast difference between the 
second and first presentations, given by 
[1]  𝑃(∆𝑐) = 𝐻 (
∆𝑐+𝑏
𝜎
) 
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where 𝐻(𝑧) is the cumulative normal function, 
[2] 𝐻(𝑧) ≡ ∫
𝑑𝑡
√2𝜋
𝑒
−𝑡2
2
𝑧
−∞
 
The psychometric curve, 𝑃(∆𝑐), corresponds to the probability of choosing the second interval. 
Thus, a positive bias indicates an increased probability of reporting the target in the 2nd interval (and 
thus corresponds to a negative mean for the underlying Gaussian distribution). The maximum slope 
of the psychometric curve, denoted 𝑠, is related to the variance via 
[3] 𝑠 =
1
√2𝜋𝜎2
 
A large slope indicates small variance and thus highly sensitive performance, thus we define 
sensitivity as the slope. Using this measure, we quantified individual participants’ as well as the 
dyad’s sensitivity: 𝑠𝑀𝑎𝑥 for the more sensitive participant, 𝑠𝑀𝑖𝑛 for the less sensitive participant, and 
 𝑠𝐷𝑦𝑎𝑑 for the dyad sensitivity. We defined ‘collective benefit’ (CB) as the ratio:  
𝑠𝐷𝑦𝑎𝑑
𝑠𝑀𝑎𝑥⁄  . Values 
of collective benefit above 1 indicate that the dyad managed to gain an advantage over its better 
member. Values below 1 would indicate that collaboration was counterproductive and that the dyad 
did worse than its more sensitive member. Here we focus on slope and sensitivity of decisions. The 
use of a symmetric 2-IFC design ensured that overall, decision biases were negligible and did not 
vary systematically between the conditions.    
Results   
Condorcet’s Jury theorem asserts that successful collective decision making would require that 
private opinions are elicited independently first and then aggregated. A prediction of this account 
that has been supported by empirical evidence is that any social influence that undermines the 
independence of private opinions is detrimental to the wisdom of crowds by reducing the diversity 
that provides the extra information earned from consulting more than one opinion (Lorenz et al., 
2011). Adapting this prediction to our experiment would follow that dyadic sensitivity should be 
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higher under IND vs INF condition. However, we did not observe any overall difference between the 
dyad sensitivity in the IND vs INF condition in experiment 1 (two tails paired t-test, 𝑠𝐼𝑁𝐷= 4.6, 
𝑠𝐼𝑁𝐹=4.7, t(20) =-0.2, p = 0.86, Figure 2A). We observed considerable variability among dyads, both 
in dyadic sensitivity under each condition and in the direction of change in dyadic sensitivity across 
conditions (Figure 2A, lines in the left panel, Supplementary Figure 1A). Such variability, even under 
IND condition, could be indicative of different cognitive processes at work for dyads with high vs. low 
sensitivity under IND condition. This possibility was in line with the prediction of Mavrodiev and 
colleagues that increasing social influence may paradoxically benefit the dyads that failed under IND 
condition with minimal social influence (Mavrodiev et al., 2012). Therefore, dyads were divided into 
two groups: dyads that accrued collective benefit (CB>1, 12 out of 21 dyads) under IND conditions 
and those that failed to accrue collective benefit (CB<1, 9 dyads) (counterbalanced order of INF and 
IND conditions was maintained). In dyads that were successful under IND condition (CB > 1), Ten out 
of 12 successful dyads got worse under INF condition, and 2 dyads actually improved under INF 
condition (see Supplementary Figure 1A and Supplementary Dataset). Consequently, we observed a 
trend indicating that social influence impaired successful dyads’ joint decision making (𝑠𝐼𝑁𝐷= 5.7, 
𝑠𝐼𝑁𝐹 = 4.8, t(11) =1.5, p = 0.15, Figure 2B). Most critically for the purpose of our question, dyads who 
failed under IND condition (i.e. CB < 1) did significantly better with increased social influence under 
INF (𝑠𝐼𝑁𝐷= 3.2, 𝑠𝐼𝑁𝐹=4.5, t(8) =-2.4, p = 0.04, Figure 2B)
*.  
The above results may be criticised as a post-hoc justification for a null result. We therefore set out 
to replicate this finding under experimental conditions that ensured collective failure in the IND 
condition. Recent works have underscored the importance of similarity of competence for collective 
                                                          
*
 It may be argued that the results of Experiment 1 should be qualified by an interaction in a 2 (success vs 
failure) x 2 (IND vs INF) ANOVA. However, the first factor (success vs failure) is not independent from the 
dependent measure (i.e. dyadic slope) and application of an ANOVA would be problematic. Rather than using a 
statistical analysis with dubious validity, we opted for seeking the more convincing evidence of replicating the 
surprising findings in a separate experiment. 
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success (Bang et al., 2014). Indeed, in Experiment 1, high performing dyads showed higher similarity 
in performance, measured as the ratio between the performance of the worse and best members 
(
𝑠𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝑠𝑀𝑎𝑥⁄ ) , (two tailed t-test, t(19) = 2.14, p = 0.04). Previous research showed that pairing two 
partners with very different abilities will be counterproductive such that the group will do worse 
than the better partner (Bahrami et al., 2010, 2012b; Bang et al., 2014; Mahmoodi et al., 2015). 
Specifically, when dyad members make joint visual perceptual decisions, adding noise to the stimuli 
presented to one of the dyad members (and thereby reducing similarity between individual 
sensitivities) drives the dyad to do worse than its own better member who did not receive noise  
(Bahrami et al., 2010, 2012b). In experiment 2, we used this manipulation to casually impair dyadic 
performance in the IND condition and predicted that these dyads should benefit from increased 
social influence under INF condition.  
In the second experiment dyads did not accrue any collective benefit in the IND condition: as 
predicted, dyadic sensitivity was significantly below the sensitivity of the better member of the dyad 
(one tailed paired t-test, 𝑠𝐼𝑁𝐷= 3.44, 𝑠𝑀𝑎𝑥=3.87, t(14) =2.07, p = 0.028). Thus, our experimental 
manipulation succeeded in generating collective failure under minimal social influence of IND 
condition. Critically and replicating the results of experiment 1 even more strongly, dyadic sensitivity 
was significantly higher with increased social influence under INF (vs. IND) condition (𝑠𝐼𝑁𝐷= 3.44, 
𝑠𝐼𝑁𝐹=4.15, t(14) =2.7, p = 0.017, Figure 2C).  
In order to gain a better understanding of the mechanism by which social influence might have 
improved collective decision making in INF condition in Experiment 2, we compared the participants’ 
individual sensitivity under IND condition to the sensitivity of his contribution to the joint decision 
under IND and INF conditions separately.  As noted in the Methods, on each trial, one participant, 
the arbitrator, announced the joint decision. Under IND condition, the arbitrator’s role was 
restricted to disagreement trials and depending on trial number (odd or even) in the block, one of 
the dyad members was assigned this role. Under INF condition, because only joint decisions were 
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made, each trial had an arbitrator, assigned by the same “odd or even trial number in block” rule. 
Thus, we had a complete record of who made the joint decision in each trial and were able to 
estimate the performance of each participant from his declared joint decisions. The participant’s 
decisions on behalf of the dyad could give useful insights about the role of social influence (i.e. how 
being able to discuss their decisions and possibly change their mind affected them). We calculated 
the sensitivity of the each participant’s private decisions by fitting psychometric function to their 
private decisions during the IND condition (Private-IND). To measure the sensitivity of a given 
participant’s contribution to the joint decisions, under each condition, we selected the (odd or even) 
trials in which the participant was designated to arbitrate for the group and calculated the slope of 
the psychometric function for collective choices in those trials, giving rise to joint-IND and joint-INF 
sensitivities (see Methods for odd and even trials). In the IND condition, these joint decisions 
consisted of choices made in agreement trials and in disagreement trials arbitrated by the 
participant. Joint decisions in agreement trials were identical to the participant’s private choices. 
Joint decisions in the disagreement trials arbitrated by the participant came from two sources: 
participant confirming his own private decision or changing his mind and adopting his partner’s 
choice.  Consequently, if the participants tended to change their mind during disagreement, then 
their joint-IND sensitivity would be different from their private-IND sensitivity. In addition, a 
difference between the participants’ joint-IND and joint-INF would indicate a change of strategy as a 
consequence of increased social influence. 
Given that participants’ average accuracy in private decisions was 67% ± 7% (mean ± SD) in 
Experiment 1 and 63% ± 8% in Experiment 2, we can calculate the expected rate of dyadic 
disagreement if the dyad members’ private responses were independent from one another. Like two 
coins flipped separately, we would expect dyad members private decisions to disagree on 
(0.67x0.33+0.33x0.67)*128 = 56 of the 128 trials in Experiment 1, and (0.63x0.37+0.37x0.63)*128 = 
59 of the 128 trials in Experiment 2. In Experiment 1 dyad members disagreed on 49 ±  11 out of 128 
trials  and in  Experiment 2 on 57 ±  7 out of 128 trials in the IND condition. The correspondence 
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between the empirical and probabilistically calculated number of disagreements strongly suggests 
that the dyad members’ private decisions in the IND condition were truly independent from one 
another. 
By definition, and consistent with the added noise to one of the dyad members, the private-IND 
sensitivities of the better participants were higher than these of the worse participants. Worse 
participants benefited from discussion as their contribution sensitivity increased on their private 
sensitivity (sPrivate IND  = 1.72; sJoint IND = 3.3; t(14) = 4.1, p =  0.001). Better participants slightly 
decreased their sensitivity after discussions (but not significantly so), indicating that they may over 
weighted the worse participants’ views. During the INF condition contribution sensitivity (Joint-INF) 
was not different between worse and better dyad members (sMin joint−INF  = 4.2, sMax joint−INF = 4. 
67, t(14) = 0.7, p = 0.49; Figure 3), showing a shift in collective decisions strategy from the IND 
condition. The worse member of each dyad had a significantly higher joint-INF sensitivity compared 
to both private-IND (t(14) = 10.48, p < 0.00001) and joint- IND (t(14) = 2.46, p = 0.02), an increase 
that could not be attributed to changes in sensitivity, but to  change in decision  strategy, i.e. 
tendency to follow the better member’s views with increased social influence in the INF condition. 
The better participant did not show significant difference between private-IND or joint-IND 
sensitivities to the joint-INF sensitivity. Similar results were observed when looking at the 
unsuccessful dyads in experiment 1 (see Supplementary Figure 2). 
Discussion 
We examined how social influence, i.e. gaining information about others’ views before casting one’s 
own vote, affects collective decisions made by pairs of participants engaged in a collective 
perceptual decision making task (Bahrami et al., 2010). In experiment 1, dyads with high collective 
benefit in the independent (i.e. minimal social influence) condition did not benefit from increased 
social influence; however, dyads who had failed in the independent condition did benefit from 
increasing the social influence. Experiment 2 replicated this surprising finding when collective failure 
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under minimal social influence was induced by experimental manipulation. Taken together with 
previous works on the negative impact of social influence on wisdom of crowds, our results highlight 
the double edged nature of social influence, by showing that it could also enhance dyadic decisions. 
Thus, social influence benefits collective decisions making when groups consist of highly 
heterogeneous members. Heterogeneity in performance should not be confused with independence 
of sampling noise. While two dyad members can have similar overall sensitivity, say detecting 75% of 
all the targets, under the assumption of independence of sampling noise in their private decision 
processes, we would expect (and observed here) that they end up correctly agreeing on (0.75x0.75=) 
~56% trials. Similarly, they will agree on the wrong choice in (0.25x0.25=) ~6% of the trials. The 
remaining ~38% will have to be decided by negotiation. Independence of trial-by-trial sampling noise 
in these disagreement trials would guarantee that putting the two private choices together and 
following the more confident one will allow the dyad to exceed their of the better dyad member 
(Bahrami et al., 2010; Sorkin et al., 2001). Heterogeneity in performance, however, relates to the 
overall sensitivity and is evaluated over all trials. Previous research (Bahrami et al., 2012b; Bang et 
al., 2014) has shown that a wide gap in the overall sensitivity, seen in experiment 1 and causally 
inflicted in experiment2, curtails collective benefit in the IND condition. Social influence enabled the 
dyads to overcome this debilitating condition and improve collective decision making.   
We suggest, based on previous theoretical and experimental results (Bahrami et al., 2010) that in 
disagreement trials, dyads comprised of similarly competent members exploit the independence of 
sampling noise by sharing confidence in their private decisions and achieve collective benefit. On a 
trial by trial basis, the member with higher confidence is more likely to be correct and joint decision 
based on higher confidence is more likely to be correct than a number of alternative joint decision 
strategies such as flipping a coin between disagreeing opinions (Bang et al., 2014).  However, in a 
dyad with a wide competence gap, confidence information is not sufficient for efficient joint decision 
making because people do not weight their confidence by their differing performances (Mahmoodi 
14 
 
et al., 2015). In other words, interacting individuals operate with an equality bias.  Confidence levels 
that should have been weighted according to each dyad member’s sensitivity are in fact taken to be 
equivalent, leading to underweighting of the better member’s confidence and overweighting of the 
worse member’s confidence, thereby impairing collective benefit. Mahmoodi and colleagues 
suggested that equality bias may be a consequence of individuals’ aversion to the awkward social 
situations that may arise from the competence gap such as having to continuously ignore the lesser 
sensitive participant’s opinion. Here, under IND conditions disagreements are inevitable and the only 
way to deal with them cordially is to employ some level of equality bias, thus sacrificing collective 
performance for social decorum. However, under INF condition, disagreements can be nonchalantly 
avoided, for example if the more sensitive participant speaks first and the less sensitive one 
gracefully endorses the suggested course of action. Nobody will be excluded, bored or embarrassed 
and noise-ridden, unreliable judgements will be successfully filtered out too. This could explain why 
increasing social influence helped unsuccessful dyads in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Support for 
this explanation comes from the fact that the dyad members’ respective contribution to dyadic did 
not differ in the INF condition, which indicated that the more sensitive member dominated the joint 
decisions in the INF condition. In addition, such erroneous weighting of the other member’s opinion 
(i.e. underweighting of the more sensitive member and overweighting of the less sensitive one) 
could explain the lack of collective benefit in the IND condition.  
Our quantitative design was optimized for assessing collective benefit, relating individual and dyadic 
performance, by using well established analytical and experimental tools from signal detection 
theory. In order to achieve these advantages, this approach inevitably strays from estimation and 
general knowledge tasks classically used in wisdom of the crowd studies. In these studies 
participants estimate an unknown continuous variable such as the weight of an ox (Galton, 1907) or 
the population of Switzerland (Lorenz et al., 2011). Our uncertainty ridden model for collective 
decisions employs dichotomous decisions in a visual contrast discrimination task. At first glance, this 
task may not appear less ecologically intuitive than some previous works, but it conjures up a 
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common situation in which two judges who hold different private information (due to variability in 
perceptual accuracy or gap in background knowledge) have to integrate their disagreeing private 
views and reach a collective decision. Importantly, the generalizability of this laboratory model’s 
predictions and results has been extended to other, higher level cognitive tasks such as visual 
enumeration (Bahrami, Didino, Frith, Butterworth, & Rees, 2013), to object recognition (Brennan & 
Enns, 2014), as well as to knowledge based dichotomous questions (Koriat, 2012). We therefore  
suggest that individual variations in perceptual accuracy in our task (Bahrami et al., 2012b; Baird, 
Smallwood, Fishman, Mrazek, & Schooler, 2013; Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010) play a 
role similar to variations in background knowledge in estimation tasks. Similarly, the introduction of 
noise to one participant’s display in experiment 2 is analogous to pairing experts and naïve 
participants in a knowledge based estimation task (Griffin & Tversky, 1992). 
Extrapolating from dyadic interaction to larger groups and crowds is not trivial. A theoretical work by 
Migdal et al. (Migdał, Raczaszek-Leonardi, Denkiewicz, & Plewczynski, 2012) expanded the 
laboratory model used here to larger groups. They demonstrate that the same principles working for 
dyads can lead to wisdom of the crowds, as group performance increase non-linearly with group 
size, and depend on the gap in individual performances of group members. Furthermore, they 
examine different information aggregation rules, showing that in large groups, a voting system 
performs as well as confidence sharing by discussion (which was used under IND condition) to 
resolve disagreements. Lorenz et al. (Lorenz, Rauhut, & Kittel, 2015) further demonstrated in 
knowledge based tasks a majority vote after deliberation is worse than the median of independent 
votes and from unanimous decision after deliberation. Generalization from dyadic to large groups 
may prove to be more complex as other factors come into action in larger groups. For example, 
Sorkin et al. (Sorkin et al., 2001) showed that as group size increases group efficiency decreases. 
Larger groups performed better than small groups, but failed to fulfil their performance potential, 
maybe due to phenomena such as free riders, which can lead to apathy in crowds (Torney et al., 
2015).  
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Importantly, our results that the effect of social influence is context dependent and not 
monolithically good or evil may also be generalized to larger groups as suggested by theoretical and 
experimental assessment of social influence effect on wisdom of the crowds (Mavrodiev et al., 2012; 
Sasaki, Granovskiy, Mann, Sumpter, & Pratt, 2013). Computer simulations of groups of voters 
(including pairs) estimating some unknown continuous variable suggested that the impact of social 
influence on wisdom of the crowds may depends on what the authors called the “starting state of 
collective error” under minimal social influence i.e. when the voters were not exposed to others’ 
opinions (Mavrodiev et al., 2012). This notion was echoed in another study comparing colonies and 
individual ants decisions (Sasaki et al., 2013). Colonies outperformed individuals when the 
discrimination task was difficult, but failed when the discrimination was easy. Based on the above 
findings, it is conceivable that the same mechanism that enhances group decisions under high 
uncertainty may leads to failure when individual accuracy increases. Our results suggest that a 
cognitive (rather than a purely statistical) mechanism may also contribute to this effect (in humans, 
at least).  When group members vary in their performance level, then discussion without committing 
to prior private opinions allows overcoming equality bias, and enhances group decisions.  
Our results and the diverse impacts of social influence on groups pose the question: how can one 
decide a priori on the optimal collective decision strategy? We suggest that when a big gap in 
competence or expertise is expected, for example when a committee includes a mixture of expert 
and non-expert members, it is better to skip the private decision stage and proceed directly to open 
voting and discussion. On the other hand, groups of experts such as physicians discussing a patient 
can have similar knowledge but different opinions. Such homogenous group can benefit from the 
aggregation of private decisions. To summarise, our results suggest that deciding between one and 
two-stage views aggregation procedures should be done according to group characteristics. 
We found that two-stage collective decisions tend to reflect the prior beliefs and biases of the 
decision maker (i.e. equality bias). When these beliefs reflect the reality (i.e. dyad members are truly 
17 
 
similar in competence) two-stage procedures are beneficial for collective decisions. Single-stage joint 
decisions, which tend to reflect and reinforce the judgment of the better member, are more 
beneficial when these beliefs are misguided, i.e. in the presence of big competence gap. 
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Figure Captions 
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Figure 1 – Experimental Design 
(A) In experiment 1 pairs of male participants (Dyads) performed two experimental conditions 
together – independent (IND) and influence (INF). Conditions were counterbalanced across dyads. 
Experiment 2 was identical to experiment 1, but initiated with a staircase procedure carried for each 
participant individually. This procedure was used to determine the less sensitive participant, and 
noise was added to his stimuli in the experiment proper. Each trial started with two stimulus 
intervals. Visual stimuli consisted of six vertically oriented Gabor patches that were displayed 
equidistantly around an imaginary circle. One (randomly selected) interval contained the target of 
higher contrast. In the IND condition participants indicated their individual decisions privately. If 
they disagreed a joint decision was negotiated and announced. Feedback about accuracy was 
provided. In the INF condition participants did not make an individual decision but immediately 
negotiated joint decision. Feedback on joint decision was provided at the end of each trial. (B) 
Psychometric functions from one dyad relating group choice to stimulus strength in Experiment 1. 
The proportion of trials on which the observer reported that the target was presented in the second 
interval is plotted as a function of the target’s contrast difference from on targets. The data is than 
fitted with cumulative psychometric function, resulting with estimate of bias in the responses and 
slope of the curve reflecting sensitivity of target detection. Steeper estimated slope indicates highly 
sensitive performance, i.e. accurately identifying the target even in hard trials when the contrast is 
very low. (C) Participants sat in the same testing room, each viewing his own display. Display screens 
were placed on separate tables at a right angle to each other. A thick cardboard screen was used to 
occlude the half not viewed by the participant in experiment 2. Both participants used their right 
hand to respond. 
Figure 2 – Collective Performance 
The sensitivity of dyads in the odd ball task was estimated by the slope of the psychometric function 
fitted to dyadic decisions.(A) Overall mean dyadic sensitivity wasn’t significantly different between 
22 
 
the INF and IND conditions of experiment 1. The effect of social influence was highly variable 
between dyads (each lines depict one dyad), as were the dyadic sensitivities. (B) Dyads in 
experiment 1 were separated according to their collective benefit (CB) observed in the IND 
condition. The sensitivity of successful dyads (CB>1) slightly decreased under INF condition but 
sensitivity of unsuccessful dyads (CB>1) increased under social influence (* p < 0.05). (C) In 
experiment 2 we added noise to the display of one dyad member, causally lowering dyadic 
performance. The surprising result from experiment 1 was replicated, as social influence significantly 
increased dyadic sensitivity in the INF condition (** p < 0.02). All Error bars represent 1 SEM. 
Figure 3 – Individual Performance and Contribution in Experiment 2 
We examined individual performance level in experiment 2. First we fitted the psychometric 
function to the private choices made by participants in the IND condition to obtain private decisions 
sensitivities (private-IND). We then used half of the trials (odd/even) to obtain participants’ 
contribution sensitivities in the IND condition (Joint-IND) and in the INF condition (Joint-INF). 
Odd/even trials in the IND condition included half of the agreement trials and the disagreement 
trials arbitrated by the participant. Joint -IND sensitivity and private-IND sensitivity diverge when the 
participant changed his mind during disagreements. Odd/even trials in the INF condition (Joint-INF) 
include all the joint decisions arbitrated by the participant. We present these sensitivities for better 
dyad members and worse dyad members separately. (A) In experiment 2 the less accurate member 
benefitted from discussions after making private decisions (joint-IND > private-IND) but the better 
members did not gain a similar benefit, and got slightly worse. The absence of private initial 
decisions in the INF condition allowed better members to dominate the dyadic decisions declared by 
themselves as well as those declared by their inferior partner. This can be seen in the increase in 
performance of the worse member (joint-IND vs joint-INF) (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.005, *** p < 
0.00005). All Error bars represent 1 SEM. (B) Better dyad member’s sensitivities are plotted against 
the worse member’s sensitivities. Dyad members have big gap in private performance (left panel) 
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and become more similar after discussion in the IND condition, as worse members get better and 
better members get slightly worse.  In the INF condition both members perform as the better 
members. 
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